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VALUES AND SCHOOLING 
Perspectives for School People and Parents* 
] ames P. Shaver 
One of the most perplexing issues facing school people is posed 
by the question, "What should the school's role be in regard to 
students' values?" Some version of that question may even on occasion 
provoke concern among parents. When they do become involved in 
related disputes over what the .school should be doing - usually as 
part of an aroused minority reacting to a new element in the school 
program - parents are .likely to make such declarations as, "The 
school has no business messing with the values of our children!" 
Individually, they are likely to think, but not say aloud, "The school's 
decisions and programs should reflect my values." 
How does one answer such a basic question about the school's 
role - or, as a school man (or woman), respond to such statements 
by parents - or, decide as a parent what position to take? There is 
probably no definitive answer. Yet, a consideration of values, par-
ticularly in the context of a democratic, pluralistic society, holds some 
promise for providing a perspective from which parents and school 
people alike can formulate reasoned individual opinions that will 
be both intellectually sound and politically (in the sense of school 
politics) persuasive. It is to that promise that this lecture is directed, 
* A grant from the Utah State University Research Council for a project, 
"Relating the Research on Values to Social Studies Education," aided materially 
in the preparation of this lecture. 
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not as a dissertation on the fine points of values and democratic 
theory, but as an attempt to bring several years of work in the area 
of values and the school curriculum to bear on a very serious ques-
tion. It is hoped that what is said will be of some use to those who, 
as laymen, deal with the institution of schooling as it impinges upon 
us almost daily. 
SCHOOLING) NOT EDUCATION 
Perhaps a good place to begin is by drawing a significant and 
fairly obvious, but often forgotten, distinction between education 
and schooling. If we associate education with learning, then it is 
clear that much (some would argue, most) of our education takes 
place outside of the school. We learn from our parents, other adults, 
our siblings, our peers, and from our many encounters with the 
natural world. "Education," to quote from Stephens' (1967) pro-
vocative analysis of the school as an institution, "can be as broad as 
life itself" (p. 20). More appropriately we might say that education 
is life itself . 
The school, the formal institution for education, operates within 
a broad educational context. Outside of skill areas such as mathe-
matics, other people and institutions play a more significant role 
than the school, perhaps because formalizing education takes away 
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from its "naturalness" and 
its meaningfulness. Partly 
for that reason, the school's 
opportunity for impact is 
less - certainly qualita-
tively, if not always quan-
titatively in terms of the 
numbers of hours spent 
within its confines. 
The position of the 
school vis a vis other edu-
cational influences is an 
important part of the per-
spective from which to 
view the question of the 
school's role in regard to 
values - in terms both of 
what we (school people 
and parents alike) ought 
to expect the school to do, and what we can reasonably expeci 
teachers and school administrators to accomplish. ~10re of that later. 
For the moment, it is important to remember that schooling, not 
education in its broader sense, is the focus of this lecture. 
VALUES - A DEFINITION 
The other term central to the theme of this lecture should also 
be defined. "Values" have been defined in numerous ways. We 
have found it useful in our work (e.g., Oliver & Shaver, 1963, 
1966; Shaver & Berlak, 1968; Shaver & Larkins, 1968, in press) 
to define values as our standards or principles of worth. They are 
the criteria by which we judge things (not just objects, but ideas, 
actions, and situations as well) to be good, worthwhile, or desirable; 
or, on the other hand, bad, worthless, or despicable; or, of course, 
somewhere in between on the continua suggested by such polar 
concepts. 
As criteria or standards, values are ideas; but they are more. 
They also embody and convey feeling. For example, honesty is a 
value by which we often judge the actions of ourselves and others. 
You can describe what you mean by "honest" - that is, what kinds 
of behavior it entails. So, you have an idea of honesty. But you 
also have feelings that go with the idea. Not only is it "good" · to 
be honest, but honesty evokes positive feelings on your part; it calls 
forth an emotive reaction. In that sense, values are both cognitive, 
or intellectual, and affective, or emotional. 
Values, Attitudes, and Biases 
Values from this point of view are fundamental aspects of one's 
personality that should be distinguished from attitudes. An attitude 
(again, as we have found it useful to define the term) is a number 
of interrelated beliefs and feelings focused on some object (perhaps 
an action, situation, or concrete thing). We have attitudes toward 
- for example, toward blacks or toward our next door neighbor 
(who may be a, black) or toward communism, and so on. Our 
attitudes are affected by a number of factors, including our factual 
beliefs and our values - our standards of worth. 
Values, then, underlie attitudes, and while each of us has thou-
sands of attitudes, we have fewer values, perhaps several dozen 
(see Rokeach, 1971). 
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By the same token, we need to distinguish our biases - our 
leanings, inclinations, or partialities - from the values upon which 
they are in part, consciously or unconsciously, based. We also need 
to keep in mind the distinction between prejudice - prejudgments, 
judgments without adequate evidence - and values. Our prejudices, 
by virtue of the neat trick of psychological compartmentalization, 
are frequently not consistent with our more deeply held values. Yet, 
unthinkingly, they often affect our behavior toward children, school 
people, and parents. 
This is not the place to belabor such distinctions. They are, 
however, important aspects of a perspective from which to consider 
the central question about the school and students' values. We often 
fail to make clear in our own minds when our actions as school 
people toward students or our demands upon the schools as parents 
are based on prejudice, unconscious bias, or the careful consideration 
of commitment (values). 
Three Types of Values 
Keeping in mind three rough categories of values - esthetic, 
instrumental, and moral - can also be helpful in contemplating 
our personal positions on values and schooling. Esthetic values are 
those standards by which we judge personal experiences related to 
pleasure, especially beauty - in art, in music, in personal appearance, 
in nature, even in cookery. We all make esthetic judgments; the 
connoisseur or the academician in literature and the fine arts often 
develops complex judgmental systems. And each of us tends to 
allow his esthetic values (in regard, for example, to classical music 
or to hair style) to take on a more serious, moralistic tone. The 
aesthete is frequently a snob, but prejudice based on unthinking 
esthetic reactions is common to all of us. 
Instrumental values are used to judge performance - whether 
of equipment (Does an auto accelerate to 60 m.p.h. in twelve seconds 
or less? Is a chronometer sufficiently accurate? ) , persons ( Are 
Johnny's study habits adequate for college work? Is the class being 
sufficiently quiet and orderly so that the teacher's objectives can be 
accomplished?), or states of affairs (Is this setting sufficiently quiet 
and attractive that I can work on my lecture?). These are means 
values. That is, meeting them is a means to another end. In political 
science, they are sometimes called procedural values. We constantly 
need to raise questions about the end values sought (speed, attend-
ance at college, the teacher's objectives, the purpose of a lecture); 
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and, we also need to remember that, like esthetic values, instrumental 
values often become important in and of themselves. 
Thirdly, there are moral values. These are standards used to 
justify decisions of ethics, decisions as to what aims or actions are 
proper. For example, a person might argue that he shouldn't be 
forced to go to a bridge party because he prefers not to go. Or, one 
might judge a person's reaction upon finding a lost purse on the 
basis of the moral value of honesty. Or, capital punishment might 
be opposed in the name of a moral value, the right to life. 
These three examples illustrate an important point about our 
moral values. They vary widely in their importance and applicability. 
At the most trite level are personal preferences: "I'd prefer not to 
go." Sometimes such a statement can be explicated further: "Why 
not?" "Because I'd rather spend the evening alone." No one (except 
perhaps the person irritated by the refusal to play bridge) would 
deny one's right to have solitude a~ a value. Nor, on the other hand, 
would the recalcitrant bridge player be likely to argue that that value 
was a basic right to critical importance to human existence, applicable 
to all men as a universal value. This is, however, exactly the role 
that a value such as the right to life is likely to play. It is not a 
petty preference (petty, not in the sense of importance to one's 
personal life, but in terms of what happens to mankind), and it is 
the type of value that we are likely to deem critical in judging 
whether the actions and aims of people in this society or in others 
are leading toward a desirable existence for mankind. Such com-
mitments will be referred to in this lecture as basic values. 
Between the extremes of the right to life and personal solitude 
fall many values, differing in importance and in the breadth of 
applicability. Honesty for example, is usually deemed to be more 
than a matter of personal preference: It is sufficiently important to 
be the subject of law making; yet, it usually is not thought to be 
of utmost importance in defining the essential qualities of human 
existence. Also, some values are not applied to all men. For example, 
a member of a particular religious faith might judge his fellow 
church members by the criterion of regularity of church attendance, 
but be less likely to apply such a criterion to his acquaintances who 
belong to another church or to no church. 
So we can think, again in rough terms, of a continuum ranging 
from values that are critically important to a conception of humanness 
and are applicable to all men, to values that are important and 
"which we would like to see as many people as possible follow, to 
those which are largely a matter of personal preference. It is vital, 
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as we ask what the school's role should be in regard to students' 
values, to also ask, In regard to which types of values? 
M ore on the Nature of Values 
Other characteristics of our values are integral for a perspec-
tive adequate to viewing the school and its function in regard to stu-
dents' values. But first, a couple of points need to be re-emphasized. 
As already noted, categorizing values as esthetic, instrumental, 
or moral is at best a rough, if useful, business. It may be difficult 
to categorize some values, and they are likely to shift categories. 
Especially, as already noted, esthetic and instrumental values often 
take on the imperatives of moral values. Individuals are shocked 
when others do not share their tastes in art, music, or personal dress. 
Children are treated as "bad" because they dare talk without per-
mission in the classroom, without asking whether such talking is 
really detrimental to accomplishing the ends for which the no-talking 
rule was established in the first place. On a societal level also, values 
that seem procedural, or instrumental, in nature - such as a com-
mitment to due process of law - take on the aura of end values. 
Due process is accepted as good in-and-of-itself - a proper criterion 
by which to judge laws and the behavior of governmental officials 
(even of school officials and parents, perhaps?). And, as I shall note 
shortly, all of the hasic moral values in a democracy can be fruitfully 
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thought of as instrumental 
in at least one sense. The 
crucial point is that when 
an esthetic or instrumental 
value is used as a criterion 
for an ethical judgment -
a judgment as to the 
properness of alms or 
actions - we should ask 
whether we want that 
transfer in role to occur. 
V alue Conflict 
The lack of clear dis-
tinctions between esthetic, 
instrumental, and moral 
types of values leads us to 
another matter, also in-
/ 
volving on occasion lack of clarity - the conflicts among our values. 
In our culture, consistency - at least surface, public consistency - --
is valued. Politicians are criticized for shifting positions; parents 
worry about changing their minds in coping with their children 
from one situation to the next. It is somewhat ironic, therefore, 
(and the cause of much unconscious psychological manipulation) that 
our value systems are inherently inconsistent - a fact that we rarely 
recognize or admit. Examples are not difficult to come by. Solitude 
may be important to a man - when a bridge party is involved, but 
what if an invitation to a poker party is received? Honesty is im-
portant - but what if your girlfriend or wife asks if you like her new 
dress - and you don't! In each case, countervailing values are likely 
to prevail. The right to life is important - but how about those 
who support capital punishment? Have they no basic values on their 
side? How about the security of the community or even the right to 
retribution? 
This last example suggests that one way in which our values 
lack consistency is that shifts in relative importance take place over 
time. A few years ago, those who argued that the right to life should 
carry the day in regard to capital punishment were in the minority. 
Today, with changing court rulings and evidence that executions do 
not seem to protect the community's security by deterring crime, 
and perhaps also because of a greater awareness of humanness as a 
result of va,rious contemporary social movements and the general 
revulsion over the killing of civilians in the Vietnam War, the right 
to life has taken on greater valence. 
Contending with changes in values over time can be the source 
of much consternation, especially as one becomes older and sup-
posedly more conservative in his ways. But the fact that inconsistency 
also exists at anyone point in time is more often overlooked and, 
for that reason, is perhaps more important to a perspective from 
which to view the school's role in regard to students' values. 
Conflict within one's set of values is not a sign of maladaptation, 
but an inevitable fact of life. On a societal level, this reality was 
pointed out dramatically by the title Gunnar M yrdal (1944) and his 
colleagues chose for the report of their epic study of what was then 
(in the late 1930's and early 1940's) referred to as "the Negro 
problem" in America. Their title, An American Dilemma, was 
meant to highlight the consternation of a rationalistic, moralistic 
nation whose treatment of a large segment of its population did 
not (and does not) square with its basic moral values. In M yrdal's 
words: 
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· .. [O]ur problem is the moral dilemma of the American-the con-
flict between his moral valuations on various levels of consciousness 
and generality. The "American Dilemma," referred to in the title 
of this book, is the ever-raging conflict between, on the one hand, 
the valuations preserved on the general plane which we shall call the 
"American Creed," where the American thinks, talks, and acts under 
the influence of high national and Christian precepts, and, on the 
other hand, the valuations on specific planes of individual and group 
living, where personal and local interests; economic, social, and sexual 
jealousies; considerations of community prestige and conformity; group 
prejudice against particular persons or types of people; and all sorts 
of miscellaneous wants, impulses, and habits dominate his outlook 
(p. xlvii). 
A man say~ he believes in equality of opportunity as a basic 
value; yet he hires no blacks in his factory or gives them only menial 
jobs if hired (to a limited extent an historical example with recent 
passage of equal employment opportunity laws). Does this mean 
that equality of opportunity is not one of his values? We often say 
that we can tell what a person values by how he acts. This is true. 
But the converse - that we can tell by the same act what he does not 
value - is not. 
The employer may value equality of opportunity, but he also 
has more specific values - the right to run his business as he pleases, 
the approbation of his neighbors, and, as a negative criterion, 
"uppitiness" ("Blacks are 'uppity' when they want the same job as 
whites have."). These more specific values, made by the pressures 
of his immediate environment more salient than equality of oppor-
tunity, lead him to act in ways that belie his commitment to equality 
of opportunity. But that does not mean that equality is not one of 
his values. (Just as a man's decision to play poker doesn't mean he 
does not value solitude, or his decision not to tell his wife or girl-
friend that her new dress is hideous doesn't mean that he does not 
value honesty.) In the immediate situation, one value takes prece-
dence over another.1 
M yrdal emphasized the conflict between "moral valuations on 
various levels of consciousness and generality"; in particular he stressed 
the conflict between values on "the general plane" and the "specific 
planes of individual and group living." But it is essential to remem-
ber that, as noted above, as we attempt to apply our values to specific 
IMyrdal (1944, pp. 1027-1031) included an appendix with an austere title, 
"A Methodological Note on Valuations and Beliefs." It presents an outstanding 
discussion of how we manage to make the psychological manipulations necessary 
to maintain an appearance of a logical order of valuations when, in fact, the 
values are conflicting. (Also see Myrdal, 1944, p. xlvii.) 
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situations, conflict also occurs between values on the same level of 
generality - for example, between those values so basic to our con-
ception of democracy and to which we have such strong commitments 
that Myrdal (p. vivi) referred to them as the "American Creed." 
Many will dispute whether there is indeed such a Creed. The basis 
for that contention, as well as the importance of thinking in terms 
of a set of basic democratic values - a Creed - as one considers 
the school's role vis a vis students' values, should become clearer as 
we move through this lecture. 
The discussion of value conflict has to this point been focused 
on moral values. Conflicts also occur between our esthetic values 
and between our instrumental values; and, of course, between esthetic 
and instrumental values (the most effective way of doing something 
may not be the most pleasing esthetically, or vice versa). When 
conflicts occur between esthetic or instrumental values on the one 
hand and moral values on the other, the moral value usually carries 
the day - especially if it is of a more general level than a personal 
preference. This may be one reason for our tendency to unwittingly 
convert esthetic and instrumental values to moral status. 
Perhaps also another distinction needs to be made explicit. The 
discussion to this point has included mention of conflict between 
the values held by individuals, intrapersonal value conflict. In addi-
tion, some of the examples have illustrated interpersonal value con-
flict, that is, conflict between values as applied to the same situations 
by different individuals. Interpersonal value conflict tends to be 
fairly obvious, especially during arguments, although it can be ob-
scured by the imprecise use of language and by making our value 
claims appear to be factual claims. Intrapersonal value conflict, on 
the other hand, is more likely to be overlooked. To recognize our 
own value inconsistencies and the conflicting implications for our 
behavior and our expectations for others is extremely threatening; in 
defense, we keep our inconsistencies from ourselves. 
THE DEMOCRATIC CONTEXT 
Now it is time to set our concern with the nature of values 
in the context of a democratic society. The school, as a formal 
educational institution,)s a creature of the society it serves - in 
our case, what we refer to as a democracy. For that reason the 
perspective from which we view questions about schooling and 
values should include a considered definition of a democratic so-
ciety. 
-9-
Defining Democracy 
What concept of democracy do you bring to your reflections 
on the school? A common definition is that a democracy is a society 
which has government by the majority. As examples, we often think 
of the Greek demokratia and the New England town meeting, with 
some ideal of direct participation by the citizen in mind. Our modern 
form of government, called a republic, fits the majority rule defini-
tion of democracy by having each citizen participate in selecting 
governmental representatives who are responsive to periodic review 
at the polls. (Of course, in neither the Greek demokratia or the 
New England town meeting did all of the citizens have the oppor-
tunity or the will to participate; so unelected representatives made 
the decisions.) Based on this concept of democracy - that is, ma-
jority rule as the key element - we hear people complain, for 
example, about court decisions limiting prayer in the classroom 
because "the majority want prayer and, in a democracy, the majority 
should have its will." 
What, however, if a national plebiscite were held on a question 
such as, "Should all Mormons be executed?" - and the response 
was a clear-cut majority in the affirmative. Would we say that was 
clearly a democratic decision to be carried out by the government 
because it was mandated to do so by a majority vote? Undoubtedly 
not! 
As a matter of fact, of course, even taking such a vote would 
be an unquestionable heresy to the democratic faith. People (and not 
only those threatened with extinction) would be quick to respond 
that democracy involves not only majority rule, but protection for 
minontIes. (And, ironically, many of the same people who argue 
for prayer in the school on the basis of majority rule would now 
argue for protection of minorities; a good example of value conflict 
and the shifting of value commitments as the pinching shoe shifts 
feet. ) 
But why majority rule and why protection of minority rights? 
The clue lies in a common response to the somewhat facetious 
example of a plebiscite on genocide: "It would be inhumane." Or, 
"You just don't treat humans that way." Underlying such reactions 
is an ideal of humanness, that simply being human and an individual 
demands certain consideration. We have referred to this in our 
attempts (e.g., Oliver & Shaver, 1966; Shaver, 1964, 1967, 1968; 
Shaver & Berlak, 1968) to conceptualize the essentials of democracy 
as a concern for human dignity. Each individual is deserving of 
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consideration2 because he is human, and equal in that sense, if not 
in wealth, intellect, or physical prowess. 
Majority rule then follows as a weighing of the votes of equals, 
with the scale shifting according to the number of votes on each 
side. And, minority rights take on meaning as elements in our defini-
tion of human dignity. The right to life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness, to freedom from "despotic" government, to freedom 
of speech, press, religion, to due process of law, and to equal treat-
ment by the law3 - such values, especially as spelled out in our 
basic political documents, along with others such as the right to 
freedom from hunger and lack of shelter added during the Great 
Depression, essentially define what we mean by dignity. A person 
has human dignity when those rights and freedoms are protected. 
In this definition of human dignity, basic moral values also 
function as instrumental values. The defining characteristics are 
instrumental in two senses: (1) They provide procedural guidelines 
as they are interpreted by the courts and other governmental agencies; 
and (2) preserving each helps to maintain the broader concept of 
dignity. For example, as 
long as the right to speak 
out freely is preserved 
(that is, as long as govern-
mental policies and actions 
are judged by and forced 
toward meeting this cri-
terion), it is more difficult 
for the dignity of individ-
uals to be denied on other 
matters. 
It is worth noting the 
paradoxical position of our 
courts, and especially the 
Supreme Court with its 
position of ultimate review, 
in relation to the values in 
the democratic creed. The 
other two branches of gov-
2Scriven, 1966, builds a basis for a democratic ethic on the notion of equal 
consideration. In our own work (Oliver & Shaver, 1966, pp. 46-48), we have 
recognized the close relationship between equality and human dignity. 
/ 3Harmon's (1964) excellent analysis raised provocative questions about which 
of our political values are simply fetish commitments to convention and which 
are indeeded basic to a conception of democracy. 
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ernment - the executive and legislative - resting on electoral bases 
reflect the democratic concern for majority rule; the courts with 
their unelected judges function to protect the individual and min-
ority rights that are also essential to our conception of democracy. 
When it exercises this obligation, the U.S. Supreme Court in particu-
lar becomes subject to incredibly vituperative criticism. 4 The critics, 
who would likely be the loudest to cry if their rights were violated, 
evidence an unfortunate shallowness of understanding of the demo-
cratic ethos. 
Human Dignity and Intelligence 
Another aspect of human dignity that is critical to the con-
sideration of the school's educational function is the ideal of man as 
an autonomous, intelligent being, on both a personal and societal 
level. This is not to say that our ideal man is completely free to 
do as he wishes, nor that 
he is an unfeeling, unemo-
tional, totally rational be-
ing. But he is assumed 'to 
have the right to self-ful-
fillment, to the control of 
his own destiny/i and in 
making his decisions, emo-
tion and commitment are 
to be tempered by reflec-
tion. 
In light of the commit-
ment to intelligence as an 
essential element of hu-
manness, it is not surpris-
ing that a democratic 
society also believes in the 
improvability of intellec-
tual abilities and that the 
4Dahl (1966) has suggested that the evidence is lacking to prove that the 
U.S. Supreme Court has frequently gone against the wishes of the majority. 
Extremely vocal minorities may cry out so loudly that it appears a majority have 
been affronted. 
5This is a statement of ideal, not necessarily of fact. I t raises the question 
of determinism, of free will, and the extent to which man is free to make choices. 
These questions are related to the ideal, but the existence of commitment to the 
ideal is a separate matter, as is to some extent the question of the functionality 
of the ideal. 
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school is generally assumed to have responsibility for improving 
decision-making abilities. The school has been clearly assigned that 
part of education having to do with formalized thought, as in mathe-
matics. On occasion, school people attempt to move beyond, into 
the improvement of thinking for everyday life. But, as John Dewey 
(1916, p. 148) noted, thinking involves risk: Once individuals begin 
to think, the end product cannot be guaranteed. Trying to improve 
the thinking skills of young people can, therefore, be dangerous. 
And school people have found that when they take seriously and 
act upon the responsibility for improving intelligence outside narrow 
academic limits, severe criticism is often the result. The reason for 
this ironic state of affairs becomes clear when we recall the conflict-
ing nature of values and couple that understanding with the notion 
of a pluralistic society. 
Pluralism - A Sine Qua Non of Democracy 
It is not uncommon to hear people refer to monolithic societies, 
especially when discussing communist nations such as the U.S.S.R. 
and the People's Republic of China. The narrow application of 
such a term to nations containing millions of people is somewhat 
absurd. With the variety of experiences and backgrounds that indi-
viduals have in different regions and social-economic strata, even 
in China, it is hard to believe that close familiarity with many 
individuals in any society would reveal "massive uniformity." The 
same is true, I have found, with small rural communities in Utah 
that give a surface appearance of being monolithic. 
Yet, there is a certain sense in which it is meaningful to talk 
about monolithic societies, communities when there is a determined 
drive toward uniformity; in national or local communities, and 
whether of a political or religious nature, strong, frequently conscious, 
efforts to subjugate individual differences often do lead to consider-
able uniformity, at least on the surface. In particular, describing 
such a society as monolithic makes sense when it is contrasted with 
another type of society - one that recognizes that people do come 
from different backgrounds, in part because of religious, economic, 
and social groupings, and which welcomes and encourages (albeit at 
times with misgiving) the diversity of opinion that results. It is this 
latter type of society that is referred to here as pluralistic. 
Each of us has a set of beliefs - factual and evaluative - about 
J the world that determines how we behave. As Charles Beard (1934) 
put it: 
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Every human being brought up in society inevitably has in mind a 
frame of social knowledge, ideas and ideals - a more or less definite 
pattern of things deemed necessary, things deemed possible, and things 
deemed desirable; and to this frame or pattern, his thought and action 
will be more or less consciously referred. This frame may be large 
or small; it may embrace an immense store of knowledge or little 
knowledge; it may be well organized with respect to categories of 
social thought or confused and blurred in organization; and the ideal 
element in it may represent the highest or lowest aspirations of man-
kind. But frame there is in every human mind. This is known, if 
anything is known. If the fact be denied, if a large, clarified, and 
informed frame of purposes is rejected, is deliberately and ostenta-
tiously put out at the front door of the mind, then small, provincial, 
local, class, group, or personal prejudices will come in at the rear 
door, occupy the background of the mind, and constitute the frame 
(op. 182). 
The point is that each of us has a frame of reference - what Beard 
refers to as a "frame of social knowledge, ideas, and ideals" - and 
that we act in accord with this frame. And, each person's frame of 
reference is the result of his experiences. 
There is a great deal of commonality in experience - among 
members of the same family, community, social, religious, or occupa-
tional groups. Our group affiliations (formal and informal) are 
fairly reliable predictors of beliefs. But no two people have exactly 
the same experiences, whether during the particularly formative years 
as children or during the latter maturing years as adults. Conse-
quently, each has a somewhat different frame of reference. Emphasis 
on diversity among groups should not be allowed to obscure the fact 
of inevitable heterogenity within groups. 
A society committed to pluralism, as ours is, recognizes the 
contributions to be made by diversity. Variety may be the spice of 
life, but the pressure of diverse views in a community serves more 
important functions - the posing of problems overlooked by people 
with highly similar outlooks on life, the availability of a greater range 
of alternatives for handling problems, even the rejuvenation of com-
mitment as clashes with those of unlike mind challenge and force a 
reconsideration of one's own values. It is this, and not just dissent 
for its own sake, that Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, 
himself on occasion a not-too-popular dissenter and defender of indi-
vidual and minority rights, probably had in mind when he noted: 
"I do not know of any salvation for society except through eccentrics, 
misfits, dissenters, people who protest." Because intelligent decision-
making is a vital aspect of the core concept of human dignity, 
pluralism is a sine qua non of democracy; for without a variety of 
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views, decision-making is not meaningful. In a monolithic society, 
despite the form that may be followed, the result is foreordained 
and procedures for decision-making are a facade. 
Pluralism is, then, necessary for democracy. The recognition 
and valuing of group and individual differences gives meaning to 
the decision-making component of human dignity and, in addition, 
provides an empirical basis for the concern for individual minority 
rights that acts as a counterweight to majority rule. It is not acci-
dental that in a period of minority group unrest, we find educators 
(e.g., Nimnicht, Johnson, & Johnson, 1972) calling for a change 
from a "melting pot" concept of education to a "tossed salad" one 
that emphasizes the distinctiveness of different cultures and life styles. 
But pluralism is not all honey and cream; it creates stresses, too, 
as has been amply evident in recent years. The .§train is reflected 
in the schools that must serve a pluralistic society. To determine 
what one's mandates are is not easy for school people - particularly 
if they ' are aware of the inevitable influence of their own frames of 
reference and want their decisions to be more than an affirmation 
of the prejudices and biases of the particular groups to which they 
belong. 
And, here we come back to an earlier comment on the import-
ance of understanding the intertwining of the nature of values with 
pluralism in answering, as parents or school people, questions about 
the school and students' values. Value conflict on an intrapersonal 
level is due largely to inherent inconsistencies among our commit-
ments. On an interpersonal level, both the built-in inconsistencies 
and differences in frames of reference contribute to conflict as values 
are applied as criteria. This is true for esthetic, instrumental, and 
moral values. But because moral values are more directly relevant 
to important questions of proper aims and actions for a democratic 
society, they merit special mention. 
Values As a Cohesive Force 
Our basic values are vague. It makes sense to talk about a 
core of values that makes up a democratic ethos (M yrdal's American 
Creed) only when one remembers that values do have both cognitive, 
or intellectual, and emotive, or affective, meaning. People who have 
commitments in common in the sense that they have similar emotive 
reactions to a value term, such as freedom of speech, mayor may 
not agree on the value term's cognitive, or intellectual, meaning. 
Common commitments are vital to the cohesiveness of a society. 
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Anthropologists pinpoint the non-intellectual nature of such com-
mitments by referring to them as "projective reality." Such truths 
are important in the same sense as elements in a religious faith, not 
because of their scientific verifiability, but because of the affect of 
their assumed presence. 
A common core of value commitments is especially important to 
a pluralistic society. As well as being cohesive on an emotive level, 
it provides the basis for confrontation and debate among those with 
contending points of view. Discussion as a process of communication 
aimed at resolving differences and coming to acceptable aims and 
actions is impossible without commitments in common, whether openly 
recognized or unstated. So, the vagueness of the terms for the 
core of commitments in the American Creed is functional. 
At the same time, conflict arises when the values in the Creed 
are applied as criteria for judging specific situations, for then their 
cognitive meaning must be explicated. One person who "feels 
good" about freedom of speech may think that it means that one 
should be allowed to say anything he wishes; another person who 
also "feels good" about freedom of speech may think that it means 
that people should be allowed to say only that which does not offend 
others. When four letter words were used by students on the Berkeley 
campus a few years ago, 
apparently to pro v 0 k e 
thinking about what ap-
peared to be indifference 
in our society to the killing 
in Viet N am, some saw 
the students' signs and 
chants as an outrageous in-
sult. Others saw them as 
a legitimate attempt to use 
symbols to jar people into 
thinking about a moral 
Issue. 
But when such conflicts 
over the cognitive, or in-
tellectual, meaning of a 
value occur,6 a person 
opposed to an action taken 
6Note that the courts are the institution responsible for providing authorita-
tive definitions of legal-value terms. Again, the nature of their task embroils the 
courts in heated controversy. 
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in the name of a value such as freedom of speech does not reject that 
value, but uses other values to defend his position. Consequently, the 
so-called "filthy speech movement" which was defended in the name 
of free speech was opposed in the name of majority rule (preserving 
the speech standards and the sensitivities of the majority) and law 
and order (use of such speech was thought to be a flagrant violation 
of anti-obscenity rules and also might provoke violence). 
The value chosen to be emphasized (neither side was likely to 
deny totally the importance of the value used by the other to support 
its position) was a function of the frames of reference of the people 
involved. And these differences in frames of reference are not only 
acceptable, but valued in a democratic, pluralistic society. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOOL AND PARENTS 
Now, having dealt with some important considerations of per-
spective, it is time to turn to a most perplexing and potentially 
perilous matter: What should the school's role be in regard to stu-
dents' values? To some extent, the temptation has been too great 
and hints about my prescriptions for that role have been dropped 
along the way. What follows, then, is an attempt to build on the 
preceding discussion, emphasizing and underscoring previous points, 
without, I hope, being overly redundant. 
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School People as Agents 
It is important to ap-
proach the question about 
values and schooling with 
a clear recognition that 
the teacher and the school 
administrator are agents of 
the society. That is why 
considerable proportions of 
this lecture have been de-
voted to reflections about 
that society. As school 
people and as parents con-
templating and debating 
the school's obligations and 
prerogatives in the area of 
values, we must constantly 
query the meaning of this authority-agent relationship, which is 
confounded by the fact that individual members of the power-granting 
authority (the society) are the clients of the agent. 
Some implications of the authority-agent relationship bear di-
rectly on the values and schooling question. For example, because 
school people are clearly in an authority-agent relationship with 
society, a teacher or administrator who accepts a position in a public 
school but is not committed to the basic democratic ethos of the 
society has signed a contract under false pretenses. The school is not 
the place for subversion of the society, in the sense of encouraging 
or advocating the destruction of the values and basic governmental 
forms set up, with all their limitations, to protect our conception of 
human dignity. The society is clearly within its rights in demanding 
that those who would use the school for subversion not be hired, 
or that they be fired if discovered after employment. 
Obviously, in light of the earlier discussion of values and plural-
ism, a decision as to what constitutes subversion may be difficult 
to make. Some of the teacher's legitimate activities in regard to values 
will be taken by some parents to be subversive - and they will be 
in one sense, because they involve helping students to think for them-
selves. The end result may be rejection of some of the parents' 
value definitions and priorities. 
It is of utmost importance, given the conflicting nature of our 
values and the pluralistic nature of our society, that the teacher 
who calls to the attention of his students basic values that are 
receiving short shrift in the local community not be condemned as 
subversive. For, as agents of the society, the teacher and school 
administrator must be beholden to a conception of democracy (as 
attorneys should be responsive to a conception of justice) that goes 
beyond responding to strident local interests and prejudices. The school 
person is not a servant of the parents in his district. As an agent of 
the society, he has a professional obligation to promote education in 
the broad democratic context, not just to reflect parents' desires. 
Such a stand, as any practicing teacher will tell you, can be 
highly uncomfortable, if not untenable. The power to contract for 
services is in the hands of local school boards, and they are of and 
responsive to the local clientele - as they should be. The argument 
is not that the school program should be taken out of the hands 
of parents and given over to professional school people. It is rather, 
that decisions about what the school should be doing should be 
made in light of its role as an institution of a democratic society and 
the somewhat paradoxical responsibilities of school people in their 
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authority-agent, professional-client relationships with parents and 
students. Understanding this position may make school people more 
willing to assert themselves against unexamined local prejudices; it 
should make parents more willing to tolerate if not support school 
personnel in their exercise of professional responsibility. 
Another implication is that as professionals, school people have 
educational responsibilities that extend beyond the young people in 
their classrooms or adult education in the usual sense. The school 
cannot be expected to reform the society that supports it. But, as 
professionals, school people should be concerned with helping their 
clients - children and parents - clarify and develop their views 
of the society and the school's role in that society. In short, the pro-
fessional responsibility of teachers involves more than educating 
children in s~bject matter specialties; it also calls for systematic 
thought on their part as the basis for interaction, even educational 
endeavors, with parents in the process of determining what the 
school's role should be. What a blessing, of course, if parents initially 
brought to such discussions a perspective - a frame of reference, if 
you will - that included an understanding and appreciation of value 
conflict and pluralism in the context of the democratic commitment 
to human dignity. That they so rarely do points to a major failure 
of the school as an institution. 
Dignity and Values in the School 
The democratic commitment to human dignity, especially if 
students are considered to be humans/ has much to say about what 
the school should be doing, and what parents should demand it 
does, about values. If one takes seriously the ideal of the human 
as a thinking, intelligent being with a right to control his own 
destiny, it is clear that the school's role is not to impose values. 
Instead, an important aspect of the school's legitimate concern with 
the improvement of intelligence should be helping students to clarify 
(and learn how to clarify on their own) the standards they use in 
making decisions about worth. To be assisted in becoming aware 
of what one's values are, to be helped to verbalize them, both in 
terms of intellectual and emotive meaning, to be aided in defining 
and applying value terms, and to be urged to be aware of the conse-
7 A comment by a well-meaning friend is of the type that suggests that such 
a remark is not totally facetious. When I noted that my two children, ages 13 
and 15, had enjoyed a recent skiing vacation and apparently had needed to get 
away from the grind of daily life for a while, he commented, "Well I'm sure. 
Children are like humans." The undoubtedly unconscious slip of tongue was 
significant (shades of Freud!). Too often we forget that young people are not 
like humans, they are humans! 
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quences of acting in accordance with certain commitments - these 
would be valuable services for students and the society. 
This basic position - that the school's role is to assist students 
develop a basis for their values that is as rational as possible, along 
with the analytic concepts to continue the clarification after leaving 
school - is a basic theme for discussing values and schooling; but 
there are some variations to be played on the theme depending on 
the types of values under consideration. 
The School and Esthetics. In esthetics, for example, the school's 
proper role in the context of human dignity is to expose the student 
to different esthetic experiences and provide the opportunity for more 
sophisticated esthetic judgments. There can be no basis for teaching 
that one esthetic experience is "better" than another; · there are no 
final criteria, for beauty resides in the eye of the beholder. Esthetic 
values may be different and critical schemes may be more complex, 
but the aesthete should not confuse sophistication and complexity with 
ultimateness. To demand that the student adopt esthetic judgments 
based on a system of values developed from a bias that precludes 
the very art forms that the student finds pleasurable is not only an 
unrealistic approach to education, but a denial of the student's dig-
nity. The freedom to arrive at one's own conception of what is 
pleasurable, after exposure to other forms and the consideration of 
other criteria, may not be a basic value in the American Creed, 
but it is consistent with the commitment underlying that creed. Of 
course, that right to choice must be juxtaposed with other rights; 
the right to esthetic choice, when expressed as the choice of acid 
rock music that conforms to a criterion such as a loud, strong beat, 
might well conflict with someone else's choice of quiet classical music, 
not to mention his right to peace and quiet. 
Unfortunately, music, art, and literature teachers have a tend-
ency to forget that their esthetic judgments depend on a set of 
assumptions not shared by many others, including a goodly number 
of their students. Their classes sometimes take on a preachy tone 
and an implicit, if very obvious, rejection of student esthetic values. 
Freedom from attempts by esthetic enthusiasts and sophisticates to 
impose their standards should be a by-word of democratic schools. 
Instrumental Values - The Need for Dialogue. Instrumental 
values call for a somewhat different tack. As with esthetic values, 
the school person should take care that subtle transitions from instru-
mental to moral do not take place. In addition, as with other values, 
the school should help the student build as rational a base as possible 
for his own instrumental values. This would include involving the 
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student in considering means-ends relationships, as well as asking 
what end values underlie the student's instrumental ones and whether 
he has unknowingly let his instrumental values take on the tone of 
moral imperatives. 
This type of critical examination needs to be turned inward 
on the school as well. Many of the standards applied in the school 
setting are instrumental, and self-examination is badly needed. Has 
a criterion of classroom behavior such as having children in their 
seats and quiet (often applied as the principal peeks through the 
door on a brief hallway excursion) taken on value of itself? Is such 
a standard actually functional in terms of the end values (the pur-
poses and objectives) of the school, and therefore worth retaining? 
Are esthetic values, such as used in judging hair length or dress 
styles, being applied as if they were instrumental values without 
examining the underlying assumption of functional relationships? 
The professional staff of each school or school district should 
undergo a critical self-assessment of its instrumental values. They 
then will be ready to show basic respect for the students by explain-
ing to them the functional nature of the instrumental values of the 
school, instead of simply insisting on conformity. The justification to 
students of the school's instrumental values in terms of assumed 
consequences will necessitate that the purposes of the school be con-
fided to the student. This is not a ridiculous proposition as it is the 
student who is the object of those goals. A new feeling of self-
respect would be a likely outcome if students were also asked to 
consider what the goals should be for their education. 
If involvement in justifying values is undertaken as a serious 
dialogue and not as a ruse to dupe or seduce students into con-
forming, students must be allowed to question the assumptions under-
lying standards without condescension or threats of retribution from 
school people. In addition, they must be helped to develop analytic 
modes of thought for identifying problems and arriving at reasoned 
decisions. 
The kinds of issues about school management with which stu-
dents will initially be most concerned will vary from time to time. 
Currently they might involve such questions as: Will long hair lead 
to a breakdown in the school's educational environment? Or, at what 
point is deviant clothing likely to disrupt learning? Whenever we 
treat young pe9ple as humans capable of thought, we are likely to 
find our conclusions challenged. This is an uncomfortable position 
lfor those who have relied on an authoritarian relationship to maintain 
their "superior" position over their students. Yet, in the long run, 
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the sincere involvement of students in establishing the school's instru-
mental values would not only be in line with our commitment to 
human dignity, but it could help to make the school a much more 
meaningful and less inimical institution for the students. Among 
other outcomes, the change in relationship between student and 
institution might also make the job of teaching more pleasant for 
many people.8 
Moral Values - The Crux of the Matter. The school's approach 
to moral values should be along somewhat the same lines as those 
proposed for esthetic and instructional standards, but with some 
significant differences. Clearly, the school has the same obligation 
as with esthetic and instrumental values to assist the student in 
developing a basis for his moral commitments that is as rational as 
possible. This holds true for the range of moral values from personal 
preferences to the basic values in the Creed. 
There are many facets to an adequate values education pro-
gram. A basic element simply is getting students to clarify what 
they believe their commitments to be (see, e.g., Raths, Harmin, & 
Simon, 1966). A major emphasis particularly in moral values edu-
cation, however, must be the recognition of value conflicts - in 
personal preferences, in the middle level values (such as honesty) 
that are so important to relations with others, in the basic moral values 
that are used to justify decisions about personal and broader societal 
questions of proper aims and conduct. If students were made aware 
that value conflict is always latent, that having to confront value 
dilemmas is not a sign of malfunctioning, and if they were helped 
to learn to weigh values - for example, in terms of the consequences 
of following conflicting commitments - they would be likely to 
make more rational decisions. They also would be less likely to need 
to use the psychological mechanisms for avoiding the recognition of 
inconsistency that result in incredible, unrecognized violations of 
values on the personal and social levels. 
The search for value conflict is particularly important in the 
application of basic values to the justification of political-ethical 
decisions (ethical decisions made and carried out in the political 
arena) . In our own curriculum work (e.g., Shaver & Larkins, in 
8Dewey (1916, p. 159) commented that "teachers would find their own work 
less of a grind and a strain if school conditions favored learning in the sense of 
discovery and not in that of storing away what others pour into them . . . it 
would be possible to give even children and youth the delights of personal intel-
lectual productiveness. . . ." In short, the point here about accepting students 
as fuctioning humans applies not only to the justification of instrumental values 
but to the total orientation of the school curriculum. 
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press), we have taught students to always look for the basic value 
or values that support the positions of those with whom they dis-
agree - or to look for the basic values being relied on by the 
protagonists on an issue. The outcome for which we teach is a 
"qualified decision" - one that takes into account the negative 
consequences of a policy or action being supported (for example, the 
recognition by a supporter of an open housing law that there will 
be negative affects on owners' property rights) and the circumstances 
under which one would change his position (for example, if antici-
pated financial losses to property owners were beyond a certain 
magnitude) . 
Note that the emphasis is on coming to a decision. Focusing 
on conflicting values should not be allowed to become an avenue 
for avoiding the making of a decision, or for arguing that anyone's 
decision is as good as anyone else's. One can say, for example: 
In the dispute over racial segregation, the Negro's claims for integra-
tion are supported by our commitment to brotherhood, the equality 
of oppopunity, and to equal protection of the law. By the same 
token, however, the segregationist's position has been defended in 
terms of freedom of association, of property rights, and even of the 
right to local control in such matters. Each of these is an important 
American value (Shaver, 1965, p. 327). 
This description of the value dilemma in one societal decision does 
not argue that "each defendant's claim in a clash of values must 
be given equal consideration," nor is it an example of "relativistic 
thinking" ( Johanson et al., 1971, p. 9). Taking into account the 
society's conflicting commitments, as well as one's own (on an intra-
personal basis, each of us tends to be committed to the values cited 
on both sides of the segregation issue) is a strategy for arriving at 
sounder positions. It is not an inevitable road to relativism.9 
In a democratic society, both sides of an issue are due con-
sideration. That does not mean that differing positions automatically 
take on equal weight. Judgments can be made about the complexity 
and soundness, and therefore the acceptability, of students' position 
statements (Newmann & Oliver, 1971, pp. 278-284; Oliver & Shaver, 
1962). For example, the consequences of following one value or 
another can be examined - what might be the impact on the type 
of society in which we live - using the ideal of human dignity or 
90liver and I (1966, p. 50) have argued that the relativistic position on 
values is an inappropriate and unproductive basis for curriculum work in a 
democracy. 
-23-
a similar one such as Scriven's (1966) equal consideration as the 
long range goal. Many, if not most, value conflicts can be resolved 
in this manner. And, the result points toward action, not away 
from it. 
In many cases, of course, it is not obvious that the pursuit of 
one or another of the conflicting values will enhance human dignity 
more in the long run. Or put differently, that judgment will depend 
upon one's frame of reference. Although the teacher will want to 
emphasize that it is important to make some decision (the world 
does not sit still because value dilemmas are hard to resolve and 
decisions are difficult to make), his task will be to be certain that 
the student is being as rational as possible, not to insure anyone 
answer. 
One qualification must be entered. Sometimes the violations 
of basic American values are so gross, as with our treatment of 
blacks and women, that a teacher can only be seen as derelict in 
his duty if he maintains that his role is only to point out both sides 
of the issue. This might seem obvious if a history teacher did not 
comment on the moral beastiality of the Nazi's "final solution" to 
the "J ewish problem." Many parents would, perhaps, be amazed 
at the frequency with which this piece of history is either not treated 
in class or discussed as historical fact without expression of moral 
repugnance. The avoidance of responsibility may not seem so obvious 
(think back to the earlier discussions of prejudices and of conflict 
between specific and general values) when the fact that members 
of a minority group find employment, education, and housing widely 
denied them on the basis of skin color (or sex) is treated (if not 
avoided altogether) in class as an interesting bit of sociological data. 
Inculcation and Dignity. Proposing that the teacher not hesi-
tate to point out and even condemn extreme violations of human 
dignity (even though they, too, are justified in this society by refer-
ence to basic values) raises specifically the issue of the appropriateness 
of value inculcation. It is, however, to a large degree a red herring. 
It has already been noted that, as damaging as it may be to the 
ego of some school people, parents tend to over-estimate the school's 
power to shape their children, especially outside of the specific skills 
areas such as mathematics (even with all the instruction devoted to 
grammar, the speech patterns of home and community generally 
have sufficient staying power to resist modification). The school, 
and in particular individual subject areas in the curriculum, has 
limited influence as compared to the powerful reinforcers available to 
parents and peers. In fact, most of the school's attempts at inculca-
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tion of values - as in the esthetic areas of music and literature -
only establish and then confirm the student's image of school people 
as rather well-intentioned individuals, but bumbling and out of con-
tact with reality. 
Although there are some individual exceptions, school people 
generally lack the genuiness and the relevance to impose values on 
students. Instead, their posturing alienates the young. When, how-
ever, teachers can grant students the respect that allows sincere 
dialogue, the power of insight is such that value clarification in 
regard to matters of importance to the student (and this includes 
significant social issues) can have a great impact (see, e.g., Raths, 
et aI., 1966). 
What about the Parents? The thrust for rationality may be even 
harder for parents to tolerate than inculcation. The human dignity-
rationality position insists, for instance, that the teacher must not 
always insist that "Honesty is good," but ask such questions as: 
"What is meant by honesty?" "What may be the consequences of 
not being honest?" "Under what circumstances (Le., when con-
fronted with the violation of what other values) could one legitimately 
choose not to be honest?" This pattern of questioning would obvi-
ously be particularly vital in dealing with the basic values of the 
American Creed. 
In a democratic society, parents should not only tolerate such 
inquiry, but should encourage it as a legitimate educational function 
of the school, one that is not likely to be carried out elsewhere. 
The home is a difficult environment for critical inquiry into values: 
The relationships are too complex, too fraught with emotive power; 
it is too difficult for the parent in his intense relationships with his 
children to stand off from his own frame of reference and ask ques-
tions that are not subtle reminders of what the child ought to believe. 
Moreover, our concept of human dignity demands that, as important 
as the home may be as the root of one's values, some broader 
context for value development is crucial - not just in the interests 
of the society, but for the good of the maturing individual. Kahlil 
Gibran (1923) has expressed, as only a poet could, the heart of 
the meaning of human dignity for child rearing: 
Your children are not your children. 
They are the sons and daughters of Life's 
longing for itself. 
They come through you but not from you, 
And though they are with you yet they 
belong not to you. 
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You may give them your love but not 
your thoughts. 
For they have their own thoughts. 
You may house their bodies but not their 
souls, 
For their souls dwell in the house of 
tomorrow, which you cannot visit, not even 
in your dreams. 
You may strive to be like them, but seek 
not to make them like you. 
For life goes not backward not tarries 
with yesterday. 
You are the bows from which your children 
as living arrows are sent forth. 
Let your bending in the archer's hand 
be for gladness. . . . 
The implications are potent for values education in and out of the 
home. What, for example, is suggested about the basis for the fre-
quent alienation of child and parent? Do parents unjustifiably deny 
the essential dignity of the young by trying to mold them in their 
own image rather than "shooting forth the arrow"? 
Basic Values - A Difference. Special note must be taken of the 
issue of inculcation in regard to the basic values in the Creed. School 
people, as agents of the democrdtic society, have special obligations 
to these values. The school in a pluralistic society has no business 
imposing lesser values, even if it could; but it is obligated to teach 
the basic values of the society. 
This "teaching," because of the important cohesive function 
of the Creed, must legitimately involve the development of emotional 
commitment, especially at the elementary school level. The use of 
literature and other materials that exemplify men's dedication to 
and the importance of our basic democratic values (such as drama-
tizations of the John Peter Zenger free press episode) should be an 
important part of the curriculum (see Oliver, 1960; Shaver, 1968). 
Again, the issue of inculcation is likely to be an unfortunate 
distracter. Most of the emotive commitment to the basic values 
comes outside the school. Also, concurrent with any efforts at incul-
cation, values education in a democracy must also entail setting 
the values in a rational context, including awareness of the conflicts 
among them. The teacher, from elementary school on, should 
help the student to verbalize his commitments and give them the 
value labels (such as "equality of opportunity") of adult discourse. 
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The student should be challenged to expana the meamng of his 
values through the pursuit of questions about the consequences of 
acting on the basis of different values, by considering society's attempts 
through its government to define the values (such as are embodied 
in legislation and court decisions), and by the drawing of analogies 
to the student's own life which is in a real sense a microcosm of 
the broader society's concerns and conflicts. 
The use of analogy in this way is a powerful tool for value 
clarification. Relationships with one's peers and between young 
people and authorities tend to be, or could be, construed in terms 
of the basic values. The standard of due process, for example, can 
be clarified by applying it to the school's handling of discipline 
problems. Concepts of equality of opportunity or equal treatment 
by the law can be developed and clarified by analogy to "fairness" 
in sports - in the selection of team members in the first instance, 
and unbiased refereeing to the second. 
Here, as in expressing rightful (not righteous) indignation over 
major violations of basic values, the teacher must be careful that 
he does not knowingly or unknowingly attempt to impose his own 
value interpretations. Recall that the strength of the basic values 
as a cohesive force for society is their vagueness in conceptual mean-
ing; the teacher has no right to indoctrinate specific meanings that 
reflect his particular niche in the pluralistic panorama. This amounts 
to a caution that teachers must discriminate between value commit-
ments and the policies they suggest. The obligation to insist that 
ethical decisions be construed in terms of basic values should not 
be taken to include the freedom to insist that particular political 
actions be valued. As a citizen, each teacher has the right to full 
political participation outside the school (a right that parents and 
school administrators would do well to remember more often), but 
no right to use his classroom as a soapbox for political purposes. 
The teacher who uses his classroom for political advocacy opens 
himself to legitimate dismissal. The decision to fire a teacher on 
that ground should be made hesitantly, however. Among other 
things, the difference between the sustained pressure of advocacy 
and the occasional nonpolemic expression of one's opinion should 
be kept in mind. The latter may be an important pedagogical move, 
especially if requested by one's students. One of the school's prob-
lems is that teachers often seem plastic to students. If a teacher is 
unwilling to let his students know where he stands, he loses authen-
ticity, for young people believe that commitment is important. More-
over, if the teacher has developed in his students the skills of critical 
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inquiry and if he has established a classroom atmosphere of mutual 
respect in which he and his students are mutual searchers for ration-
ally based, and often different, decisions, there is little concern that 
his ideas will be unduly imposed on his students (see Shaver, 1970, 
in press). 
The School as an Autocratic Institution. The notion of class-
room dialogue between a professional and clients who share respect 
for one another presents an appropriate place for some comments 
on the school's application of basic values. It is ironic that the school 
in a democratic society is one of the more authoritarian institutions 
of that soci~ty. This paradox compels attention not only because 
the school might rightfully be expected to provide a model for the 
application of democratic ideals as an educational experience, but 
because students are humans to be treated in accord with the demo-
cratic ideal of human dignity. Examples such as the following 
(Silberman, 1970) are all too common: 
ITEM: A high school senior-eighth in a class of 779, active in a 
host of extracurricular activities (student marshals, General 
Organization, Key Club, after-school tutoring program, presi-
dent of the Debate Society, among ~thers), and described on 
the school's record as "intelligent, highly motivated and ma-
ture," with "excellent leadership and academic potentials" 
-is barred from the school's chapter of the National Honor 
Society on the grounds of poor character. At an open 
meeting of school board candidates the preceding spring, he 
had politely asked a question which implied some criticism 
of the high school. In the opinion of eight of the Honor 
Society's fifteen faculty advisers, none of whom had been 
present at the meeting in question, none of whom had ever 
met the boy in question, criticism of the high school is equiva-
lent to disloyalty, and disloyalty constitutes bad character. 
The seven faculty advisers who do know the youngster fight 
for his admission but are overruled. 
ITEM: (from the Montgomery County, Maryland, Student Alliance 
Report): "In the way of a few examples: one student who 
insisted that he would protest against the Vietnam War in 
front of the school was told by a vice-principal that if the 
student persisted the school official would see to it that he 
could not get into college. . . . Another high school student, 
a National Merit Scholarship Finalist, as it happened, was 
told by his counselor that he would get a bad recommenda-
tion for college because he was a 'nihilist.' He had been 
arguing with her over the values of the county school system." 
The confusion of esthetic with moral values and the lack of 
clarity about instrumental values that lead to the unreasonable appli-
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cation of often rather foolish hair and dress standards should be 
sufficient matter for concern in a democratic society; but the denial 
of the right to dissension and freedom of speech is appalling. It is 
unfortunate, but highly significant, that the courts have had to tell 
us - in reinstating students who had been dismissed from a school 
in Iowa for wearing black armbands protesting our involvement in 
Vietnam10 - that students are "persons under our constitution" 
and do not lose their rights as citizens by attendance at a public 
institution of education. 
The situation of the school is not an easy one. The distinction 
between education and schooling is particularly pertinent to its pre-
dicament. After elementary school, which often has a tremendous 
impact on young children because it is a new mode of life and 
introduces them to the basics of reading, writing, and arithmetic, the 
school becomes all too often a retentional institution. Less learning 
takes place (except informally about such things as the futility of 
the school as an institution) than most of us - students included -
often care to admit. 
The "holding tank" concept of the school is rarely talked about 
openly. Yet it is clear that the school serves as a solution to other 
than education problems for the society. The need to keep young 
people out of the labor market, to forestall the time of mature inde-
pendence in a period of affluence when the labor of young people 
is a threat to the economic well-being of their elders - these factors, 
and the tendency to keep them below the surface so that they do 
not have a direct impact on considerations of what the school should 
be about, underlie much of the school's irrelevance for students. 
To fully appreciate the school's uncomfortable current posi-
tion, caught in the throes of young people's demands for democrati-
zation, one must take into account the society's ambivalence and 
lack of clarity about the giving of adult status to young people. 
How can (should?) a modem society handle the transformation 
from childhood to full adult status when more adults are not urgently 
needed (except, as some of the young claim, to die in the elders' 
wars) as they were in yesteryears? Granting the vote to eighteen-
year-oIds was a gesture toward adult status for the young. It is 
probably no coincidence that that action came during a period of 
vast and sometimes startling increase in awareness on the part of 
the young. Greater exposure to the world through travel and tele-
lOTinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District. 393 US 
503, (1969). 
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vision and increased sense of self and moral sensitivity are all obvi-
ously present. They no doubt bear an intricate cause and effect 
relationship to the growth of groups such as the hippies, who rejected 
the pat pursuit of an economically oriented life, and to our moral 
uneasiness about the war in Vietnam, with its killing of innocent 
civilians and the "flower of our youth" (to quote President Johnson ) . 
Even with the vote, our modern society has no rite de passage 
- the killing of a wild beast, a slashing of the chest after a fortnight 
in the jungle, or circumcision Jor males or defloration or early 
marriage for females - to mark quickly and clearly (for both the 
individual and the society) the transformation from childhood to 
adulthood. This attenuation of acceptance to mature status, with 
so much time spent (largely involuntarily - and boringly, if not 
painfully) in school as society's unexamined and largely unspeakable 
solution to the problem, confronts school people with special kinds 
of difficulties. Their own frequent fears of young people and the 
need of some to exert authority for personal satisfaction, both of 
which make it difficult to deal with young people in an open, respect-
ful manner, do not help school people in confronting the situation. 
N or is it of any great assistance that parents often share the same 
fears · and needs, and so tend to identify with the school's side of 
the struggle out of sympathy from their own attempts to cope with 
young people who demand independence and self-esteem as their 
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elders rarely thought of 
doing. 
Receiving the vote 
one sign of adulthood 
has reduced somewhat the 
visible span of time in 
limbo between childhood 
and acceptance as an 
adult. But it has not re-
duced the ambiguity in a 
significant qualitative sense 
- especially for the school. 
There are still many dis-
concerting years there for 
many youth - whose ma-
turity, in the sense of 
awareness and concern be-
yond themselves and the 
local community, exceeds 
that of their parents; who are restless and impatient because their 
youthful exuberance and conviction are now coupled with an in-
creased sense of maturity and impotence; who are capable of con-
structive work but have no jobs, and so are caught in relatively 
unproductive servitude to their parents and the school; and, who, 
with their increased awareness, find it difficult to submit meekly 
and unthinkingly to authority. 
It is fairly obvious that this discussion of the strain between 
school and student has focused largely on adolescents. However, 
Friedenberg's (1959) reminder in The Vanishing Adolescent is even 
more poignant today: If adolescence is taken to be the time when 
one is searching for self-identity, there is no longer a clearly demar-
cated adolescent stage among our young. The conscious search for 
identity goes on at much earlier an age than many adults can believe, 
caught as we are in our reflections about our own early years. 
It does seem fairly easy, nevertheless, to discern a distinct upturn 
in physical maturation at about the seventh and eighth grades. But 
this developmental upswing has little significance for the respect due 
the student. That is, being at an earlier stage of physical develop-
ment, which may not mean lower emotional stability, is no excuse 
for denying respect to younger students. The notion that dignity 
caBs for respect of the individual, for freedom in developing com-
mitments, with assistance in value clarification and definition rather 
than imposition, is as applicable to elementary school students as 
to secondary ones. There is no magic point at which the child 
moves from being a lower animal to being a human; he is always 
a human in the process of becoming - at sixty-five as at six, although 
not as noticeably so. To the extent that there are differences in 
emotional or intellectual sophistication, adaptions in the form of 
schooling are appropriate - such as adopting procedures which call 
for more and more self-responsibility as the student progresses through 
the grades - but they always should be contemplated and made 
in the context of dignity. 
Ironically, most elementary school teachers are more concerned 
with children than with subject matter, and so are more aware of 
the child as a person than are secondary school personnel. Never-
theless, the lack of a clear conception of the role of the school in a 
democracy, on the part of administrators, parents, and teachers, has 
frequently deterred elementary teachers from exercising important 
responsibilities in helping students develop their rational bases for 
/ self-fulfillment. 
Note also that an argument for an instructional program and 
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for the administrative handling of students on the basis of the demo-
cratic ideal of human dignity should not be taken as a plea for 
permissive schools. This stand is quite different from conceiving of 
children or youth as nature's animals who should go unfettered so 
that their personalities will not be ruined. That position can be as 
disrespectfuP1 as the current autocratic structure of the school. Rules, 
guidelines for behavior, are still needed, as they are in the "adult" 
society. But as there, even if imperfectly, the rules need to be de-
veloped (legislated) and applied (enforced) in a context of dignity 
and mutual respect. The forms may not, and probably cannot be 
the same for the adult society and the school; but to the extent that 
the school's rules and administration are consciously shaped by demo-
cratic ideals there can only be improvement. 
The nature of the professional-client, teacher-student relationship 
must also be kept in mind. A call for mutual respect should not be 
taken to imply the denial or the disparagement of the teacher's 
professional competencies or responsibilities. To the contrary, one 
of the arguments against democratic schooling is that it demands 
too much of the teacher and the school administrator - as well as 
of parents. One cannot expect school people, so the counter-argument 
goes, to have the intellectual competencies and the ability to step 
out of their own frames of reference that are required by the value , 
clarification process, or the patience and understanding to explore 
rules with students and apply them in a democratic manner. 
Actually, however, we can expect no less of our teachers. With 
the current oversupply of teachers, we could begin to insist that we 
have in the classroom only persons who feel and evidence concern 
and respect for youth. The amount of college coursework in subject 
matter areas and in pedagogy may be easier to assess, but is probably 
less pertinent as a qualification for educating youth. There are some 
indications from educational research findings that teachers' person-
alities and value systems are at least as strongly related to student 
achievement and interest in science as is subject matter background 
(see, e.g., Rothman, 1969). Employing teachers whose personalities 
are congruent with the society's commitment to dignity can be 
expected to have a learning pay-off at the same time that it improves 
the general environment of the school. 
llA. S. Neill's Summerhill (1960) is a thoughtful plea for permissiveness based 
on the value of dignity and respect for the individual. Although Neill goes further 
in his re00mmendations than is probably feasible for public schools (or for the 
personnel of many private ones), the basis for his approach is significantly dif-
ferent from that of the sympathetic bleeding heart whose benevolent ministrations 
deny children the respect due them. 
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Obviously, too, another constraint is that any school refonn 
based on the model of democracy advocated here must exemplify 
the concept of value conflict. The refonners would not demand total 
freedom for youth, but a balancing of rights against rights, or perhaps 
more appropriately, of rights against responsibilities. Applying our 
basic values to decision-making in the political-social context raises 
difficult questions; that will also be the case in the school. Questions 
such as, When does one student's freedom of expression - through 
speech or other symbols such as hair or clothes - interfere unduly 
with another student's right to an orderly, quiet educational atmo-
sphere? are not easy to answer. But they must be raised and con-
fronted as part of the educational process. Students must be involved 
in dialogue and allowed to assist in making decisions cast in the 
recognition of value conflicts and the consideration of the conse-
quences of following one value criterion as against another. 
As long as school people and parents make decisions and impose 
them on the young, it is hardly realistic to insist on responsibility 
to self and to others; responsibility assumes the freedom to make 
mistakes (which, of course, adults do all the time, but rarely admit 
to their youthful subordinates). Few would advocate turning the 
young loose in the school without guidance; but when the conse-
quences do not seriously affect other persons or, if personal, do not 
involve serious threat to life, limb (as with a young child playing 
with fire), or future happiness (a judgment we should always be 
chary of making for others), it would be better to err in the direction 
of permitting blunders - in part for the learning involved. We 
must insist that the student live with the consequences of his decisions. 
If bailed out of any difficulties by a well-meaning (but disrespectful) 
adult, he will learn little about responsibility. In addition, the 
dialogue among students, teachers, and administrators must include 
the weighing of the value of independence against the ideal of 
maturity of judgment. 
SUMMING UP 
The classroom could be an exciting, meaningful place for youth 
(beyond the initiatory stages of elementary school), rather than 
a place to mark time fulfilling arbitrary and irrelevant assignments12 
12Not so, of course, to those students who are oriented toward dealing with 
abstractions, particularly in the subject areas of the school. Academician-parents 
must be cautious in their judgments about the proper ingredients of schooling. 
Their children, as a result of the atmosphere in the home, are more likely to value 
conceptualizing for its own sake. Intellectual masturbation is an all-too-frequent 
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while waiting to become an "adult." School people have too long 
ignored their basic responsibility as agents of a democratic society 
to maintain an institution whose processes are modeled on demo-
cratic ideals and whose curriculum reflects the democratic concern 
with dignity and rationality. Parents, with their pressing concern 
for socializing their offspring in their own image, have often been 
too tolerant of the school's deviations from democratic noDUS. Partly 
out of self-interest, they have leaned toward over-respect of the schoo], 
and as a corollary demanded compliance and obedience toward the 
institution and its personnel at the expense of the self-respect of the 
child. A redress of balance is needed, not as retribution for the 
school's past sins, but to bring the institution in line with the ideals 
of society it serves. Only then will the school be able to tolerate and 
help shape the aspirations of youth in line with the promise of our 
democratic commitment to human dignity. 
source of pleasure among those who consider themselves the "intellectual elite"-
which, of course, they belong to because they define it themselves in terms of 
abstract conceptualizing, rather than the type of intellectual problems that busi-
nessmen and other non-academicians commonly deal with in their daily lives. 
College-bound students (which most of the children of academician parents are) 
are likely to conform even though they see school programs and classroom assign-
ments as empty requirements to be fulfilled at whatever level necessary to obtain 
another goal-entrance to college, where, it is hoped, formal education will be 
meaningful. 
On the other hand, it is also worth noting that university professors, particu-
larly those in the social sciences, are likely to be more liberal in their political 
beliefs than is the general public. Personal experience indicates that such people 
are more likely than many to see the repression of their children by the schools 
as a more compelling concern than the form of academic achievement. 
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